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Kristeva, Stoicism, and the “True Life of Interpretations” 
 The repertory of theories, practices, and stories associated with Greek 
and Roman Stoicism fills a significant compartment in the western 
philosophical archive, the meaning and value of which are ceaselessly 
reconfigured by each generation’s archivists. In the recent decades it is not 
only specialists who have browsed, rearranged, and relabeled these shelves; 
following Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the Subject as well as a powerful 
synergy between Anglophone scholars and cognitive-behavioral therapists, 
there is now a wave of enthusiasm, inquiry, and experimentation.1 Into these 
vigorous currents I propose that we release yet another stream, namely the 
numerous commentaries on Stoicism in the psychoanalytic, literary, and 
broadly cultural criticism of Julia Kristeva.  
 My first objective in this article is to explain the scattered, elliptical, but 
insightful and coherent remarks Kristeva threads throughout her oeuvre.2 
These remarks are difficult to understand, both because they require 
familiarity with the audacious scholarship of Émile Bréhier and Victor 
Goldschmidt, and because Kristeva eschews dispassionate clarity in favor of 
affective involvement with the topics and situations on which she writes.3 In 
other words, she performs her ethics of interpretation. “Interpretation” for 
Kristeva designates an ethico-epistemic attitude, and the “true life of 
interpretations” designates a personally and politically healthy form of this 
attitude. Working through these scholarly and methodological challenges is a 
good way to appreciate how the theme of “interpretation” can tie together her 
reflections on language, ethics, politics, theology, and metaphysics, all of 
which emerge in response to the Stoics’ renowned systematicity.      
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 My second objective is to sketch a critical response to Kristeva’s 
presentation. The point is certainly not to praise or condemn her accuracy, but 
rather to develop a new perspective on the “existential option” that the Stoic 
life is, or—following Kristeva’s intervention—could be today.4 This perspective 
is an important complement to those on offer from Foucault and the 
mainstream Anglophone tradition.   
1. Kristeva on the Stoic “Life of Interpretations” 
 In “Psychoanalysis and the Polis,” Kristeva writes,  
I would say that interpretation as an epistemological and ethical 
attitude began with the Stoics. . . . Man, says Epictetus, is “born to 
contemplate God and his works, and not only to contemplate them but 
also to interpret them . . . .” “To interpret” in this context, and I think 
always, means “to make a connection.” Thus the birth of interpretation 
is considered the birth of semiology, since the semiological sciences 
relate a sign (an event-sign) to a signified in order to act accordingly, 
consistently, consequently. (79) 
 
 This quotation makes clear the importance Kristeva attributes to Stoicism as 
the originary and preeminent example of a certain interpretive model. I will not 
address her assertion about the Stoics’ chronological priority. What interests 
me is instead her claim that the Stoics’ “epistemological and ethical attitude,” 
which is revealed in their interpretive activity, can be encapsulated by the term 
“semiology,” i.e. “making a connection” among three elements: an “event-
sign,” a “signified,” and an action. What does that mean? 
 Before attempting to clarify this, it is best to complete the list of 
elements connected, according to Kristeva, in Stoic semiology. In “From One 
Identity to Another” she argues that “every language theory is predicated upon 
a conception of the subject that it explicitly posits, implies, or tries to deny” 
(Desire 124). There she mentions Stoic language theory only in passing, 
saying that she will not “refer back to the stoic sage, who guaranteed both the 
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sign’s triad and the inductive conditional clause” (125). In this compressed 
reference the phrase “inductive conditional clause” refers to the connections 
we have just seen among event-sign, signified, and action. We might think of 
this as the secondary level in Stoic semiology. I will explain it more thoroughly 
in a moment. But the term “sign’s triad” introduces a prior semiotic level, 
which is internal to the event-sign: namely, the connections among a 
signifying phrase, a conceptual signification, and an external state of affairs. 
We might call this the primary level of Stoic semiology. Kristeva believes that 
Stoic semiology is an “epistemological and ethical attitude” of the 
accomplished philosopher who, as she says here, “guarantees” both the 
primary and the secondary levels of connectivity.   
 In order to understand this connectivity we need to detour via 
Kristeva’s beliefs about language.5 For Kristeva, language ought to be the last 
in a series of mechanisms for mediating and managing the intensity of our 
needs, joys, and frustrations vis-à-vis other people. She expresses this by 
saying that the engine of language is “primal want” (Powers 5, 35) or the 
archaic, sexual, maternal “Thing” (Black Sun 12-20; New Maladies 62; This 
Incredible Need 28).6 To put it another way, the Thing represents our 
unnameable and overwhelming fascination, love, frustration and hatred 
toward other people, which is fundamental to the human experience. Our first, 
infantile way of relating to the Thing is via kinetic and sensorial rhythms and 
patterns, which Kristeva calls “the semiotic.” These are experienced as an 
immediate relation to the maternal body as possessor of the Thing. But in the 
normative sequence of development, the child “abjects” this relation to the 
maternal body and invests its loves and hatreds in paternal signifiers instead 
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– the “big Other” in place of the “(m)other.” Kristeva calls this the “thetic 
break”; like Lacan, she designates the ensuing domain of signification “the 
symbolic.” But Kristeva places greater emphasis than Lacan on the enduring 
importance of both semiotic patterns and “imaginary” polysemy within 
language, both of which she sees as supplements and potential rivals to 
signification as a means of negotiating our relation to the Thing.7      
 Let us look more closely at Kristeva’s theory of thetic signification. 
Each thetic act not only connects a signifying phrase, a signification, and an 
external referent, but also represents the “subject of enunciation” in her 
mediated interaction with the Thing.8 For example, if I say “the Stoics are 
brilliant,” on the one hand I am using a string of syllables, i.e. a signifying 
phrase, to express a symbolic signification. I am also connecting this symbolic 
signification with an external state of affairs, namely the actual being-brilliant 
of some group of philosophers. But on the other hand, I am positioning 
myself, the subject of enunciation, vis-à-vis the symbolic Other, of which my 
addressee is the present representative. I am struggling to say what I can 
never articulate, but which we might gloss as “you frustrate me,” “I hate you,” 
“I love you,” “please satisfy me,” and so on. To put it another way, beneath 
every illocutionary function, such as explaining, persuading, and so on, the 
foundational and unachievable illocutionary aim is to occupy a satisfying 
position vis-à-vis the Thing.    
 In fact, it is this illocutionary drive that brings together the three 
elements of the primary semiotic level in a complete utterance. In Revolution 
in Poetic Language Kristeva writes,  
There is no sign that is not thetic and every sign is already the germ of 
a ‘sentence’ . . . . Stoic semiology, which was the first to formulate the 
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matrix of the sign, had already established this complicity between sign 
and sentence, making them proofs of each other. (44) 
 
Why does Kristeva say that “every sign is already the germ of a ‘sentence?’” 
Because even if a child utters the proto-sign “woof-woof,” she intends the 
sentence “this is a woof-woof”; it is in predication that the subject of 
enunciation appears. The child is enunciating this proposition for her 
caretaker in the hope of eliciting a response. “Yes,” the father might say 
adoringly, “that is a woof-woof.” Thus it is the “primal want” (for approval, for 
attention, for satisfaction) behind predicating enunciation that creates the 
“complicity between sign and sentence.”  
 Next we must explain why Kristeva claims that the Stoics themselves 
were “the first to formulate this matrix of the sign” and “had already 
established this complicity between sign and sentence.” In order to 
reconstruct her sequence of thought, we must first recall that the Stoics 
anticipated the modern triad of sign, sense, and reference (Mates 19-26). For 
the Stoics written or spoken words do not designate bodies or bodily 
qualities.9 Rather, a written or spoken “signifier” (≈ sign) designates an 
incorporeal “signified” (≈ sense), which expresses an impression made upon 
the speaker’s soul by the bodily “bearer” (≈ referent) of this signified (LS 33B). 
The incorporeal signified may be thought of as an “event” or effect, which the 
speaker understands and asserts as a true or false “sayable” about the 
underlying bodily cause. Because they are incorporeal, these “sayable 
events” do not “exist”; they are not “beings.” Rather, they are “somethings,” 
which “subsist.”10 Thus the Stoics articulated something like what Kristeva 
calls “the sign’s triad” or “the matrix of the sign.”  
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 Second, we must follow up Kristeva’s vague reference to Émile 
Bréhier’s pioneering study, La théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme 
(cited at Revolution 243 n. 49). According to Bréhier, Stoic metaphysics of 
language 
radically separates . . . two planes of being: on the one hand, deep and 
real being, force; on the other, the plane of facts, which play on the 
surface of being, and which constitute a multiplicity of incorporeal 
beings without connection or end (13).11 
 
Later Bréhier speaks of reason’s “spontaneity” as the “active cause” which 
“constructs” rational significations (16).12 It is Bréhier’s reading of the 
evidence that allows Kristeva to attribute some ancestor of her own 
psycholinguistics to the Stoics, as she reveals in saying they “had already 
established this complicity between sign and sentence.” Because Bréhier 
says that facts “play on the surface of being,” where reason operates 
“spontaneously,” he opens a space between linguistic thought and the 
corporeal reality to which it refers. Into this gap Kristeva inserts the dynamism 
of the primal want, which closes it by conjoining signifying phrases, signified 
concepts, and bodily states of affairs in the process of enunciation.    
 We are now in a position to return to the secondary level of Stoic 
semiology and the Stoic sage’s “guarantee” of the “inductive conditional 
clause,” i.e. the connections among sign, signified, and action. Here we must 
begin by elucidating Kristeva’s slightly confusing terminology: at the 
secondary level, both “event-sign” and “signified” will refer to a primary triad, 
i.e. a signifying phrase, a conceptual signification, and an external state of 
affairs. In order to understand how, we must again follow up a vague citation 
in Kristeva’s footnotes (“Psychoanalysis” 79 n. 1), this time to Victor 
Goldschmidt’s Le système stoïcien et l’idée de temps. One of the key 
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passages for Goldschmidt is section eight of Epictetus’ Enkhiridion: “Don’t 
search for events to happen as you want, but want events to happen as they 
do” (Goldschmidt 79).13 At the point where he introduces this quotation from 
the Enkhiridion, Goldschmidt also cites the same passage of Epictetus’s 
Discourses as Kristeva. It is worth quoting Goldschmidt at some length, since 
his exact wording informs Kristeva’s meaning.  
In order to “want events as they happen,” we must know and 
understand them, we must interpret them. Man, says Epictetus, is born 
“to contemplate god and his works, and not only to contemplate them, 
but also to interpret them” [Disc. 1.6.19]. “Interpret” means make a 
connection. (79) 
  
Recall now the quotation from Kristeva with which we began: 
Man, says Epictetus, is “born to contemplate God and his works, and 
not only to contemplate them but also to interpret them” [Disc. 1.6.19]. 
“To interpret” in this context, and I think always, means “to make a 
connection.” (“Psychoanalysis” 79) 
 
It is clear that Kristeva had Goldschmidt’s book open to this page as she was 
writing. Understanding what Goldschmidt means by “making a connection,” 
and what it has to do with “wanting events as they happen,” will turn out to be 
essential for appreciating Kristeva’s claims. 
 For Goldschmidt, the phrase “want what happens” encapsulates the 
fundamental aspiration of the Stoic life of interpretations, which is to align your 
volition with the reason of god, whose providential law is also the universal 
causal nexus of destiny. In other words, god’s benevolent and rational plan 
determines absolutely every sayable event in the Stoic universe. Goldschmidt 
distinguishes two planes of interpretation in Stoic philosophy, which are two 
pathways toward cognitive and affective alignment with god. In the first 
pathway, “the two terms, when we’re dealing with events, are separated in 
time: one, the event-sign, which we must ‘interpret,’ is given to us in the 
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present” (79). Note here the term “event-sign,” which Kristeva picks up: “The 
semiological sciences,” she says, “relate a sign (an event-sign) to a signified 
in order to act accordingly.” In this pathway the interpreter attempts to align 
her volition with god’s by inferring, through her grasp of theology and physics, 
which future event will follow from the present event-sign. She then desires 
that divinely ordained future event.  
 But Goldschmidt believes that the emphasis in Stoicism falls instead on 
the second pathway. This is what Epictetus calls the “use of impressions,” i.e. 
the cautious scrutiny of our thoughts about whatever is presently happening. 
In this pathway we do not connect a present event-sign to a future one, since 
this is often beyond our merely human capacity. Instead, acknowledging our 
cognitive limitations, we connect a present event-sign to an appropriate 
reaction on our part. As Goldschmidt says, “The use of impressions brings us 
already to action. Understanding an impression consists in knowing ‘which 
virtue we should use in connection with the object that has produced it’” (123, 
quoting Marcus Aurelius 3.2.3). 
 Let me illustrate this in terms of Stoic logic and moral psychology. As 
an example of an “event-sign,” I will adapt a topic from the Roman Stoic 
Musonius Rufus (XVIIIB, esp. 101.3-12): I am at dinner, and the host serves 
me bread and butter. (This event-sign encompasses an entire primary triad: I 
represent it to myself with a signifying phrase, the incorporeal signification of 
which corresponds to the bodily state of affairs.) Now, let us also imagine that 
I already have in my soul some Stoic beliefs, like that intemperate behavior is 
vicious, and vice is to be avoided. What, in this case, is the “inductive 
conditional clause” to which Kristeva refers, which connects an event-sign to a 
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signified and consequently an action? It is something like this: “If I use too 
much butter, or eat more than my share of bread, or get food on my clothes, 
this is intemperate. If this is intemperate, it is to-be-avoided.” Now, according 
to Stoic psychology, if I assent to the proposition “it is to be avoided,” action 
follows immediately.14 Thus in this example I have connected an event-sign, 
namely “I am eating bread and butter” to a complex signified, namely “using 
too much butter, eating more than my share, and eating messily are to-be-
avoided.” (This too encompasses a primary triad.) Furthermore, I have 
connected this signified to action: by assenting to its signification, I 
immediately put myself on guard against bad dining behavior. 
 Now that we understand how Kristeva reads the Stoic model of 
interpretation, we are ready to appreciate her critical response. This comes 
across most clearly in a passage later in “Psychoanalysis and the Polis”:  
the person through whom knowledge comes about is not mad, but (as 
the Stoics have indicated) he is (subject to) death. The time of accurate 
interpretation, that is, an interpretation in accordance with destiny (or 
the Other's Phallus), is a moment that includes and completes eternity; 
interpretation is consequently both happiness and death of time and of 
the subject: suicide. The transformation of sexual desire into the desire 
to know an object deprives the subject of this desire and abandons him 
or reveals him as subject to death. Interpretation, in its felicitous 
accuracy, expurgating passion and desire, reveals the interpreter as 
master of his will but at the same time as slave of death. Stoicism is . . . 
the last great pagan ideology, tributary of nature as mother, raised to 
the phallic rank of Destiny to be interpreted. (83) 
 
 I will not attempt to address every facet of this dense, poetic passage. 
Rather, I will focus on three claims it advances about the Stoic model of 
interpretation. First, Stoic interpretation “includes and completes eternity.” 
Second, it is a sort of “suicide” or death. These first two claims take their 
inspiration from Goldschmidt, but substantially transform the significance of 
his reading. Third, Stoic interpretation is an “ideology.” This claim moves 
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beyond the “epistemological and ethical attitude” of Stoicism in order to 
encompass its political implications.   
 It is best to deal with the first two claims together. The first, that Stoic 
interpretation “includes and completes eternity,” rests on Goldschmidt’s 
analysis of the interplay of the two pathways of Stoic interpretation. As we 
have just seen, for Goldschmidt it is because I know my limits that I do not 
attempt to understand the providential nexus of destiny, but rather focus on 
aligning my volition with god’s within my immediate circumstances. Thus I put 
all my energy into buttering that bread as beautifully and virtuously as I can, 
for example.15 Yet in “wanting what happens” in this limited way, I 
nevertheless integrate myself into the entire series of divinely willed events: 
the divine law that I obey in consuming dinner virtuously is the same law that 
governs nature (Goldschmidt esp. 101, 156). In fact I am not other than god, 
for god pervades the entire universe as its active principle (LS 44B, 54A-B), 
and is particularly concentrated in rational souls (LS 47O.2). This is the key to 
understanding Stoic compatibilism: insofar as I manage to think and act in 
accord with nature, divinely determined events become my freely chosen 
actions. Thus, in a sense, the eternity of providence is telescoped into my 
action.  
 The second claim, that Stoic interpretation is somehow suicidal, 
emerges from the same trend in Goldschmidt’s thinking. According to the 
Stoics, “living in accordance with nature comes to be the end, . . . engaging in 
no activity typically forbidden by the universal law, which is the right reason 
pervading everything and identical to Zeus, who is the director of the 
administration of existing things” (LS 63C, translation adapted). Furthermore, 
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they insist that this end, which can also be called “happiness,” can be 
completed in an instant (LS 63I, SVF 3.54). Goldschmidt explains that on the 
one hand, this is the instant in which the Stoic sage connects the event-sign 
with an action that is natural, reasonable, and in alignment with the “universal 
law” of Zeus. The concordance of sage and god in this instant is perfect; it 
cannot be improved by temporal extension. On the other hand, because the 
moral agent’s initiative is integrated into god’s enduring providence, this 
instant expands throughout time. Thus the moment of virtue satisfies our 
“desire for eternity” (Goldschmidt 205), and leaves nothing lacking from our 
happiness. As Goldschmidt perorates,  
The instant, as Marcus Aurelius had said, is able to contain and 
encompass the centuries of cosmic cycles. Thus the instant extends 
throughout the present of Zeus, like a drop of wine, according to 
Chrysippus, extends to the dimensions of the ocean and penetrates its 
entirety (207; cf. 146-51, 198-207) 
 
 Goldschmidt’s tone is rhapsodic, but Kristeva’s appropriation of his 
reading transforms it into a pointed critique. For Kristeva, the eternity 
completed by the Stoic would be what she calls “time as project, teleology, 
linear and prospective unfolding; . . . time as history” (“Women’s Time” 17). 
The “teleological project” here is that of god, whose purpose has determined 
once and for all what is good and choiceworthy or bad and avoidance-worthy. 
In effect, God’s volition hypostasizes the symbolic values established for the 
speaking subject by the thetic break. In other words, divine law and reason 
are names given to the big Other of signifiers, in which the speaking subject 
has invested her drive energy at the moment of surrendering the narcissistic 
jouissance of the mother-child union. Kristeva believes this thetic break is 
experienced as a sacrifice or loss (“castration”), which reiterates and 
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exacerbates the “primal want” underlying all interpersonal relations (Sense 
76-85). When symbolic value is fixed once and for all, this loss becomes 
irremediable. This is why Kristeva calls the totalizing instant of Stoic 
interpretation a kind of suicide or death. “Time . . . in Western philosophy 
always refers to the time of death,” she writes (This Incredible Need 44). The 
consequences for the subject of this totalization of value and time vary, but 
might include absence of affect, evacuation of meaning from the world, or 
compensatory, violent acting-out.16  
 The alternative for Kristeva is to avoid temporal finalization and 
evaluative totalization. She believes this is possible because, as I emphasized 
earlier, symbolic signification continues to be underpinned by semiotic 
articulation and imaginary polysemy, both of which go back to our non-
linguistic relations to our primary caregivers. These a-signifying modes of 
relating, emoting, and enjoying combine with thetic signification in “vital” and 
“creative” speech, which Kristeva calls signifiance. Examples in Kristeva’s 
work include the speech of poets and literary authors in general, which 
Kristeva calls “a kind of second birth” (Revolution 70); the discourse of literary 
appreciation, through which we participate in the “sharable singularity” of 
creative “genius” (This Incredible Need 29-41; Sense 27-9); the speech of 
psychoanalysts, who avoid “playing dead and adopting a stoic apathy” (New 
Maladies 73) in order to make each analysis a “work of art” (New Maladies 
34), combining thetic reason with counter-transferential jouissance (New 
Maladies 3-102, esp. 34-5; “Psychoanalysis” 81, 83-4, 86-7; Sense 62-4); the 
masochistic sublimation of Christian mystics (This Incredible Need 47-63); 
and—most controversially—the speech of maternal passion (This Incredible 
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Need 42-7).17 All of these modes of interpretation, i.e., of “making a 
connection,” encourage the creativity and vitality supposedly choked off by 
Stoic totalization. In other words, they make it possible to initiate genuinely 
new beginnings, breaking the linear teleology of historical time; and they 
facilitate the sublimation of drive in language, imbuing it with affect and 
meaningfulness.  
 Kristeva’s third claim is simply the politicized consequence of the first 
two, as is exemplified by her commentary on the Republic of Zeno, founder of 
the Stoa (Strangers 57-63).18 Given the totalization of symbolic value and 
exclusion of semiotic and imaginary interventions, Kristeva suggests that 
Stoic politics can only oscillate between two undesirable tendencies. On the 
one hand is the anomia of each individual’s obedience to divine volition, which 
replaces positive law. This is how Kristeva interprets the testimony that Zeno 
permitted cannibalism and incest in his ideal city.19 On the other, 
institutionalizing values attributed to divine volition could lead to 
totalitarianism. To both of these Kristeva prefers a middle way, in which 
citizens preserve the creativity and vitality of desire and jouissance, which 
singularize them, but use their shared investment in symbolic signification to 
collaborate in constructing narratives and making decisions.20 “The living 
political bond,” she writes elsewhere, “understood and practiced as a sharing 
of creativity, calls upon the singularity of each person: had ‘one’ forgotten 
this?” (This Incredible Need 13)  
2. Response to Kristeva 
 I have now completed my clarification of Kristeva’s reading of Stoicism 
and explanation of her critical response. In the remainder of this article I would 
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like to offer some thoughts about the merits of Kristeva’s criticism. In other 
words, I want to consider its importance for the growing number of people 
interested in Stoicism not only as an intriguing historical phenomenon, but as 
a source of guidance for pursuing wellbeing, resilience, or freedom. In the 
process I will illustrate the importance of drawing on the full range of Stoic 
authors from antiquity, here including Hierocles, Musonius Rufus, and 
Cornutus, as well as doxographies and well-known Stoics like Seneca or 
Epictetus.21 
 I will first suggest that Kristeva’s analysis sheds considerable light on 
some aspects of some Stoic texts. Let me begin with a general point of 
doctrine. One could plausibly argue that Stoic moral psychology revolves 
around a fundamental and non-rational drive, which is called oikeiōsis. No 
single word in English effectively translates of this word, though 
“appropriation” serves best. What it connotes is each organism’s impulse to 
preserve and perfect what belongs to it: in Greek its sustasis, in English its 
“constitution.”22 Seneca defines a constitution as “the hegemonic part of the 
soul disposed in a certain way toward the body” (Ep. Mor. 121.10).23 The 
disposition of the hegemonic part of the soul toward the body is the sustaining 
principle of an animal’s vital unity.24 Every animal is “pleased with,” “loves,” 
“yearns for” and “thinks well” of this vital unity, which is the animal’s self.25 
The character of this vital unity develops over time, so that a human infant, for 
example, appropriates a different constitution than she will as an adolescent, 
an adult, and so on (Seneca, Ep. Mor. 121.14-18). Up to a certain stage this 
happens without cognitive mediation, just as other animals are (supposedly) 
impelled to preserve their own constitutions. But at a certain stage something 
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changes in human beings. As Diogenes Laertius reports, “since reason . . . 
has been bestowed on rational beings, to live correctly in accordance with 
reason comes to be natural for them. For reason supervenes as the craftsman 
of impulse” (LS 57A). In other words, whereas animals are automatically 
impelled toward what will preserve their constitutions, in humans reason, or 
logos, should come to supervise impulses. Moreover, precisely this use of 
reason, since it is “natural” for mature human beings, becomes the central 
feature in their constitution and the primary object of appropriation (Seneca 
Ep. Mor. 121.14). The right and legitimate use of reason is to align our volition 
with that of Zeus, who, as we saw earlier, is identical with “right reason” (LS 
63C). Thus appropriation is designed to culminate in the resolve to perfect our 
reason, which means harmonizing it with divine Reason.  
 I would like to cautiously suggest a limited comparison between this 
developmental psychology and that of Kristeva. Granted, there is a striking 
difference between Kristeva’s flexible thinking about the drives, which she 
sometimes expresses by referring to the “archaic Thing,” and the Stoics’ 
fundamental drive toward self-preservation and self-perfection. Nevertheless, 
there is a thought-provoking resemblance between key moments in the two 
developmental theories, namely the Stoic appropriation of reason and what 
Kristeva calls the thetic break. The thetic break marks the epochal shift of 
libidinal investment from parental bodies or associated sensations to symbolic 
signifiers. In a similar way, one could argue that in the Stoic account, 
appropriation of reason shifts the fundamental impetus from things to 
reasoning about things.  
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 Let me exemplify. On the Stoic account, a child is immediately 
concerned with her own mental and bodily integrity, and even adults may be 
immediately concerned with the well-being of their children, friends, or 
spouses.26 But in order for reason to fulfill its role as the “craftsman of 
impulse,” we should not desire the well-being of our own bodies or those of 
our children, friends, or spouses for their own sakes. Rather, we should wish 
to act in conformity with universal law and right reason, and perceive that it is 
legitimate and reasonable (in most circumstances) to cherish our bodies, 
children, friends and spouses. Thus reason would intervene as the primary 
object of appropriative feelings, in a sense estranging us from prior intimacies.  
 If there is anything to this reading, it could be taken to embed deep in 
Stoic theory some of the weaknesses criticized by Kristeva. But even if this 
comparison at the level of theory turns out to be indefensible, at the level of 
practice it is hard to deny that Stoics sometimes adopt the role of ideology 
police; according to Kristeva, “wardens of repression and rationalizers of the 
social contract in its most solid substratum (discourse) . . . carry the Stoic 
tradition to its conclusion” (Desire 24). There are innumerable examples of 
this, but for reasons of space I will provide just one.  
 Although many texts by the imperial Stoic Hierocles have been 
preserved on papyrus or in the anthology of Johannes Stobaeus, they have 
only recently become easily accessible in the edition and translation of 
Ramelli and Konstan. In one Hierocles writes that “we should guard the laws 
of our fatherland as if they were second gods of a kind, and live by their 
guidance” (70-3). In fact “second gods” is a favorite simile for Hierocles, who 
also says we should treat our fatherland itself and our parents “like second 
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gods” (68-9, 82-3). This is more than a simile, of course: it points toward 
divine law and reason as the preeminent elements in our own constitution. But 
for Kristeva, Stoic god is merely a hypostasis of repressive symbolic values. 
Thus it should come as no surprise when Hierocles writes,  
I for my part welcome Zaleucus, the [legendary] lawgiver of the 
Locrians, who made it law that anyone who proposed a new law should 
do it with a noose around his throat, so that he should be instantly 
strangled and die, unless he rearranged the original constitution of the 
state in a way that was most emphatically profitable to the community. 
(71)  
 
And it is not only the laws that must be treated as second gods. Hierocles 
adds that “No less than the laws, customs must also be guarded, those that 
are truly ancestral. . . . Custom aims to be a kind of unwritten law, which has 
enrolled as its noble lawgiver the satisfaction of all those who make use of it.”  
 From a Kristevan perspective one might make two observations about 
these passages. First, Hierocles is indeed operating as a “warden of 
repression and rationalizer of the social contract”: in effect, he makes the 
symbolic values enshrined in civic law and social custom unbreakable 
parameters for choice and action. Under the regime of Zaleucus, there is 
precious little room for creative renewal through a life-giving return to pre-
rational jouissance and imagination. Who would risk democratic innovation, if 
the cost of any mistake were “that he should be instantly strangled and die?” 
Second, one might detect in this fantasy of violent reprisal, which is 
authorized by the legendary paternal lawgiver, the return of what has been 
repressed by Stoic rationalism. In other words, the energies excluded by the 
rigidification of symbolic value return as violent acting-out, even if only at the 
level of rhetoric. 
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 These considerations lead me to suspect that Kristeva has identified a 
dangerous temptation within Stoicism, something excluded from the Greek 
and Roman Stoics’ own self-understanding. However, in other ways I think 
that Kristeva’s reading is very one-sided. These all come back to a 
fundamental error, namely her consistent reading of Stoic doctrines about 
virtue as straightforward descriptions of the lived experience of Stoicism. In 
fact the ideal of virtue, which is embodied in the sage, operates rather as an 
organizing fantasy. Commentators in general pay too little attention to a 
fundamental contradiction within Stoicism: on the one hand, by explicit 
doctrine virtue can be achieved; on the other, by unbreakable convention no 
practitioner can claim that she or any other Stoic has achieved virtue.27 For 
this reason I think we should view Stoic virtue roughly as Jonathan Lear 
suggests we view Aristotelian contemplation. “Any form of life,” Lear writes,  
will tend to generate a fantasy of what it is to get outside of that life. 
This is because life is experienced, consciously and unconsciously, as 
being lived under pressure—and it is correlative to that experience that  
there is a fantasy of release. (48-9) 
  
Like Aristotle’s fantasy of self-sufficient contemplation, the Stoic fantasy 
needs to be theoretically achievable in order to make life meaningful. In 
Kristeva’s terms, this allows it to harness drive energy to symbolic 
significations. Yet it also needs to be practically unachievable, or else it would 
implode and give way to a new fantasy.    
 This insight has both general and specific consequences. The general 
consequence is that we should acknowledge how much creative improvisation 
is involved in the Stoic effort to live in harmony with divine volition. Although 
Stoics sometimes come across as vindictive agents of symbolic law, they also 
place a great deal of emphasis on circumstantial complexity. An infinite 
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distance separates fidelity to general ethical guidelines from perception of the 
virtuous thing to do in any particular situation. This is why Stoics insist that all 
errors are equal (Arius Didymus 11o).28 The sage must use her creative 
initiative in order to cross this chasm. Such creativity is emblematized by the 
unorthodox Stoic Aristo, who entirely rejects ethical guidelines, and focuses 
exclusively on the sage’s “adventitous capacity” to respond to “opportunity” 
and “circumstance” (Boys-Stones “Aristo’s Psychology”). But even within 
orthodox Stoicism, which aims to strike a balance between extemporaneity 
and principled foresight, the upshot is that every Stoic decision can in 
principle make room for creative interventions.   
 More specific consequences reveal themselves in those passages of 
Stoic texts in which the yearning to understand and imitate god becomes 
explicitly thematized. It is here more than anywhere that we might glimpse 
something like a relation to the archaic Thing, at the boundaries where a 
penumbra of drive energy suffuses thetic reasoning. I will offer just two 
examples. 
 The first comes from Musonius Rufus, who is perhaps the Stoic author 
most given to ideological policing. As I discuss elsewhere (“Philosophy and 
Sex”), his handling of sex, eating, and grooming is astoundingly 
sanctimonious. Yet events in Musonius’ biography, such as his attempt to 
reason with Vitellius’ troops during their march against Rome (nearly a fatal 
miscalculation: Tacitus, Histories 3.81), powerfully exemplify the demand for 
improvisation in the enactment of virtue. Moreover, his lectures are unusually 
rich in fantasies about divine volition, as I will exemplify with reference to 
Concerning Nourishment.29  
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 In this discourse Musonius encourages his listeners to restrict their diet 
to uncooked vegetables and dairy products, but above all he exhorts them to 
avoid meat. “Nourishment from the plants of the earth,” he claims, “is naturally 
suited to us. . . . So is nourishment from animals that are not harmed, 
especially domestic animals. . . . like ripe fruit, some vegetables, milk, cheese, 
and honeycombs” (XVIIIA 94.12-95.7). By contrast,  
He used to say that [nourishment by meat] was heavier and somehow 
impeded thought and cognition, because the rising vapors from it were 
muddier and darkened the soul. So people who eat a lot of meat 
appear to be slower of mind. (95.11-96.1) 
 
 Here we can see the beginnings of a rational justification for avoiding meat, 
which is grounded in physiology: when meat is digested, it produces “rising 
vapors” that impede cognition. From this perspective, Musonius is sketching 
an enthymeme grounded in symbolic values. This allows him to understand 
the world, and through that understanding to achieve satisfaction.30 Yet we 
should also notice the prevalence of images of heaviness, slowness, 
muddiness, and darkness. Added to the reminiscences of ripe fruit, 
vegetables, milk, cheese, and honeycombs, this creates a rich sensual 
landscape. From this perspective, Musonius is discharging drive energy 
through a phantasmagoria of images that underpins or bypasses rational 
argumentation.     
 This interplay of reasoning and fantasy climaxes in an exhortation to 
imitate the celestial gods. “Since human beings are the most akin of earthly 
organisms to the gods,” Musonius says,  
we should also be nourished in a manner most similar to them. Now, 
the exhalations of earth and water carried up to them are enough for 
the gods. So if we took the lightest and purest nourishment, he said, 
we would take the most similar nourishment to the gods. (96.1-6)  
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 Let us pause and give this strangely literal comparison of human and 
divine nourishment due consideration. Like the preceding, it is structured by 
an enthymeme grounded in theoretical commitments. The Stoics certainly 
believe that humans are the earthly organisms most akin to the gods. 
Moreover, they believe that the foundation of this kinship is our shared 
rationality.31 Even the physiology of our rational souls is similar: both are 
constituted by “breath,” which is a compound of compacting moisture and 
expansive fire (LS 47G-H, J, O-Q). This helps to explain the role of “rising 
vapors” and “exhalations” in Musonius’ comparison.32 Within this breath the 
compacting moisture is responsible for inward tension, which stabilizes 
organic forms (LS I.288). The expansive fire is the intelligent, directive 
element; thus Zeno calls the sun a “fiery kindling from the vaporous rising of 
the sea” (SVF Zeno 121), and Zeus himself is defined as “intelligent, 
designing fire which methodically proceeds toward the creation of the world” 
(LS 46A.1). This helps to explain why Musonius counsels avoidance of “dark” 
and “heavy” meat. It is on the basis of these elemental homologies between 
human and celestial souls that Musonius infers we should prefer light, pure 
nourishment.  
 On the other hand, we should also acknowledge how semiotic 
investments may underpin this line of reasoning. In making vital heat and 
breath the signifiers of human kinship with the gods, Stoic theory already 
makes respiratory and circulatory rhythms a domain in which semiotic and 
symbolic investments can easily converge. In focusing particularly on 
nourishment, Musonius accentuates this convergence. Henceforth when I eat 
my rustic cheese and honey, I can think and feel that I am ingesting the 
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rationality of the gods.33 To put it in psychoanalytic terms, this is an example 
of oral introjection: beyond my rational alignment with god, I will be replaying a 
primal bodily relation to and identification with him. Perhaps some of the 
strangeness of Musonius’ argument comes from the way in which this drive 
facilitation and imaginary fantasy combine with its implicit argumentative 
structure.34  
 I turn now to my final example, which comes from Cornutus’ Survey of 
Greek Theology. This important text has not yet been satisfyingly edited, 
much less translated into English.35 Cornutus addresses it to an unnamed 
“boy,” with whom he is discussing the allegorical meanings of Greek religious 
traditions. This text belongs to a domain of Stoic literature that scholars have 
found enigmatic. Why, they wonder, are Stoics so interested in the myths, 
iconography, and even rituals of the Olympian pantheon, which rational 
theology could conceivably render superfluous? (Long “Stoic Readings”; 
Boys-Stones “Allegory,” esp. 209–15; Algra, esp. 234–8; Lampe, “Obeying 
Your Father”)  
 Kristeva’s work points toward a new way of resolving this enigma. For 
Kristeva allegory is a paradigmatic example of how “the imaginary” operates 
“Like a tense link between Thing and Meaning, the unnameable and the 
proliferation of signs, the silent affect and the ideality that designates and 
goes beyond it” (Black Sun 100). In other words, imaginative constructions 
are halfway between symbolic signification and delirious proximity to the 
archaic Thing. For example, the allegorical imagination both “disowns” the 
surface meaning, thus clinging to the archaic Thing, and makes associative 
leaps to symbolism via acoustic and visual images, thus generating new 
! !
! 23!
quasi-meanings – meanings in which we only halfway believe, but which we 
therefore enjoy more (or at least differently).36    
 Take Cornutus’ discussion of the god Hermes. This discussion extends 
over six pages of the standard text (20-26), encompassing etymology of his 
name and epithets, exegesis of his literary and statuary images, and 
observations about some aspects of his cult. What binds this discussion 
together is Cornutus’ initial assertion that Hermes represents reason: “Hermes 
happens to be reason, which the gods sent to us from heaven, making 
humans alone of earthly animals rational, which is the best thing the gods 
themselves possess” (20.18-21).37 This assertion is justified by the 
etymological derivation of the name Hermēs from the phrase erein mēsasthai, 
meaning “contrive to speak” (ibid.). This inaugural assertion grounds the 
entire fantasy that follows, which we might call an imaginary celebration of 
rationality.  
 I will pick out just three moments in this sublime fiction. The first is 
Cornutus’ explanation of the epithet “Hermes of the golden rod.” “Of the 
golden rod (khrusorrhapis),” Cornutus writes, “because a beating (rhapismos) 
from him is very precious, since timely admonitions and the attention of those 
who listen is worth a great deal” (21.15-8). In other words, verbal castigation 
is like being beaten with a golden rod! Hermes’ rod (rhabdos) returns later in 
the discussion,  
“with which,” as Homer writes, “he soothes the eyes of whomever he 
wishes,” i.e. the eyes of the  mind, “and arouses those who are 
dreaming” [Homer, Iliad 24.343-4] – for he’s easily able both to 
encourage those who are slack and to sedate those who are excited. 
For the same reason people believed he sent dreams and was a 
prophet, turning impressions whichever way he wanted. (22.10-18)  
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In other words, Hermes’ rod represents the power of the words to magically 
stimulate, sedate, or generally lead listeners wherever the speaker wishes. If 
we permit ourselves to suspect this is slightly phallic, Cornutus will reward our 
audacity:  
The ancients made older, bearded statues of Hermes with erect 
genitals, but younger, smooth-cheeked statues with flaccid ones, letting 
it be surmised that in those of advanced age reason is generative and 
complete, but fruitless and incomplete in immature men. (23.16-22)  
 
In other words, mature reason is like an erect penis; rational admonition is like 
a “very precious” beating with an erect golden penis; with this erect penis you 
can guide your listeners wherever you wish. None of this adds anything to the 
symbolic signification of “reason”, but it certainly enriches its signifiance. In 
other words, it doesn’t change the meaning of rationality, but it makes it more 
meaningful, whether you find it enjoyable, amusing, or repulsive. For these 
are all metastases of jouissance.  
3. Conclusions 
  For Kristeva, as we have seen, the “true life of interpretations” is one 
in which each individual’s rational commitments are always amenable to 
revision from two directions: first, by engagement with the a-signifying internal 
forces of imaginary and semiotic jouissance; and second, by engagement with 
other people, including those people’s imaginary and semiotic fantasies and 
compulsions. That is why Kristeva speaks of a “true life of interpretations (in 
the plural)” (“Psychoanalysis,” 37): she believes that healthy ethics and 
politics combine shared reason with a plurality of unreasonable and 
sometimes unshareable impulses.    
 From this perspective Kristeva criticizes the Stoic life as one that 
totalizes interpretation, thus impeding creative renewal, tolerance, and 
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cooperation. In response I have suggested that Kristeva is partly right: Stoics 
do sometimes display a proclivity toward ideological rigidity. But at the same 
time, parts of their “ideology” build in the sort of stimulation for creativity that 
Kristeva demands. For example, they aspire to alignment with god’s volition, 
which is not even in theory knowable. Furthermore, even the partial alignment 
represented by virtue, which in theory is achievable, in practice is an ever-
receding goalpost. Thus it should come as no surprise that creative 
improvisation appears in many corners of Stoic literature – although these 
receive too little attention from modern historians and practitioners of  
Stoicism.  
 If the preceding is at all sound, several consequences might follow for 
“modern Stoicism”: 
1) Alongside the emphasis on reforming beliefs in the cognitive-behavioral 
reception of Stoicism, we should give more explicit recognition to imaginative 
and semiotic elements. These are often implicitly present already. For 
example, the Stoic Week 2014 Handbook introduces the exercise of “Morning 
Meditation” by saying,  
Marcus Aurelius talks about walking on your own to a quiet place at 
daybreak and meditating upon the stars and the rising Sun, preparing 
for the day ahead. You can also do this at home, sitting on the end of 
your bed, or standing in front of the mirror in your bathroom, and still 
think of the sun rising against a backdrop of stars. (Gill et al. 9; italics 
mine) 
 
 In other words, the sensory or imaginary contexts of cognitive exercises 
make a significant difference. In fact, one of the reasons that Stoicism is more 
than a primitive precursor to CBT, and thus makes a real contribution, is its 
imaginary richness. 
! !
! 26!
2) The emphasis on “technologies of the self” in the post-Foucauldian 
reception of Stoicism risks entanglement in the networks of power within 
which Foucault himself struggled to find a sort of immanent freedom. Stoic 
self-cultivation must not be reduced to any fixed catalogue of exercises 
directed toward sharply defined virtues, which tend to become ossified. 
Rather, we should give more attention to collaborative improvisation.  
 Foucault gestures in this direction when he implicitly connects “askesis” 
to creativity, especially shared creativity. “Askesis,” he says, is “the work that 
one performs on oneself in order to transform oneself or make the self 
appear” (Foucault Live 311). This interview dates from 1981, during the period 
of Foucault’s greatest immersion in Stoic “technologies of the self.” The word 
“askesis” could be taken to imply exercises of self-discipline oriented toward 
normalizing “virtues.” But that, of course, is not what Foucault has in mind:     
Homosexuality is an historical occasion to re-open affective and 
relationship virtualities, not so much through the intrinsic qualities of the 
homosexual, but due to the biases against the position he occupies; in 
a certain sense diagonal lines that he can trace in the social fabric 
permit him to make these virtualities visible. (311)  
 
What Foucault says particularly of gay communities in the 1980s should also 
be true, to some extent, in all communities. To put it another way, the 
affective, cooperative work of pursuing virtues can disclose surprising new 
virtualities. 
3) Rationalism today is often associated with secularism. By contrast, 
after Kristeva we can perceive in Stoicism (and have a framework for 
analyzing) the synergy between intense theoretical and practical reasoning 
and the fantasy of harmonization with the sacred. Modern Stoicism could thus 
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become an interlocutor in the so-called “return to religion” in continental 
philosophy, including in Kristeva’s own recent work.  
 None of these suggestions will bring us to The Truth about either 
Kristeva or Stoicism. However, all of them could expand and enrich these 
spiritual, ethical, and political traditions of thought and action.    
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1 Although Foucault delivered his lectures in 1981-82, they only reached publication 
in 2001. Of course, some of this material made it into The Care of the Self, which 
reached publication much earlier. Deleuze’s Logic of Sense had also raised Stoicism 
to prominence in French philosophy. Examples of recent, therapeutically oriented 
reception include Pies, Irvine, Robertson, Still and Dryden, and many other 
publications cited by the University of Exeter’s stupendously successful “Stoicism 
Today” and “Stoic Week” projects (http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/stoicismtoday/about/; 
http://modernstoicism.com).  
2 The following does not aspire to be an exhaustive index to Stoicism in Kristeva: 
Desire 24, 125; “Psychoanalysis” 79-80, 83, 92; Revolution 40, 44; Strangers 56-63; 
New Maladies 73, 82, 88; Intimate 74-5. I would also take Stoicism to be one 
inspiration for the “sad philosopher” of This Incredible Need 41.  
3 See the conclusion of “Psychoanalysis and the Polis”: “I would like the above 
remarks to be taken both as a ‘free association’ and as the consequence of a certain 
position. I would want them to be considered not only an epistemological discussion 
but also a personal involvement (need I say one of desire?) in the dramas of thought, 
personality, and contemporary politics” (92).  
4 I allude to what Hadot calls the “existential choice” or “fundamental choice” of each 
post-Socratic Greek philosophy (102, 114-15, 126-28).  
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5 My overview draws on all of Kristeva’s works, but see especially Revolution 25-30, 
43-56; Black Sun 40-42; Sense 32-90. I necessarily smooth over some variations in 
these accounts. Compare McAfee 13-27. Oliver remains an excellent introduction to 
Kristeva, but does not address language acquisition independently.  
6 She puts this most carefully in This Incredible Need to Believe : “this I who speaks 
unveils himself to himself inasmuch as he is constructed in a vulnerable bond with a 
strange object or an ek-static other, an ab-ject: this is the sexual thing (others will 
say: the object of the sexual drive whose ‘carrier wave’ is the death drive)” (28).  
7 Although Kristeva was profoundly influenced by Lacan, her training was not 
Lacanian (see “Lacan ou la portée”), and it is important not to conflate their ideas.  8!In this Kristeva obviously parallel’s Deleuze’s triad of signifying, denoting, and 
manifesting (16-28), though her emphases are different.   
9 To be more precise, “complete sayables” (e.g. propositions) do not designate 
bodies. However, nouns and pronouns designate qualities, which are bodily (LS 
33M).   
10 For “event” (pragma, sumbama, accidens) see LS 33B.2-3, 33q (only in volume 2), 
Seneca Ep.  Mor. 117.3. For effect, see LS 55A-D. For the basics of Stoic 
metaphysics, see LS 27.   
11 Goldschmidt expands on this line of interpretation when he compares a certain 
trend in the thought of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius to Kantian critical idealism 
(119-21). Of course, this passage in Bréhier features prominently in Deleuze as well 
(8).  
12 He is thinking in particular of concept formation and the testimony of D.L. 7.53. For 
recent discussions of the Stoic theory of concept formation, see Brittain, Dyson.  
13 Goldschmidt relates this to Marcus Aurelius 7.23 (“Does something happen to me? 
I accept”), of which he says, “So we must ‘accept’ the event and want it” (100).  
14 Strictly speaking the ensuing “impulse” will be directed at the predicate of the 
proposition “this is to-be-avoided.” See SVF 3.91 = LS 33J; SVF 3.89; compare Arius 
Didymus Ep. 6c.   
15 Goldschmidt aptly cites Epictetus Discourses 1.7.32-33, which illustrates this 
principle extremely well (169 n. 1).  
16 Note that, à propos of “the time of history,” Kristeva adds,  “A psychoanalyst would 
call this ‘obsessional time,’ recognizing in the mastery of time the true structure of the 
slave” (“Women’s Time” 17). In other words, she directly contradicts the Stoic claim 
that alignment with transcendent value equals freedom. Thus she also implies that 
Stoicism is basically an “obsessional” cultural structure. On the relation of 
obsessional neurosis to the symptoms I have just described, see especially New 
Maladies 44-65. 
17 The foregoing citations are merely illustrative: Kristeva revisits most of these 
themes many times across her works.  
18 Zeno’s Republic is lost, but various sources inform us about its contents. Here 
again it is worthwhile tracing a vague reference in one of Kristeva’s footnotes 
(Strangers 198 n. 31): her reading of Zeno’s Republic and most (if not all) her exact 
citations of Greek and Roman texts turn out to derive from Voelke 114-31, 143-5, 
152-62, 185-90.  
19 For more recent scholarship on this topic, see Schofield, Vogt. 
20 This Incredible Need 71-6. Kristeva makes a subtly different point in 
“Psychoanalysis and the Polis”: there she emphasizes how effective political 
interpretation, like psychoanalytic interpretation, needs to harness desire rather than 
sticking to “objective” rationality (“Psychoanalysis” 86-7).  21!Other significant authors who are generally neglected by neo-Stoicism include 
Manilius, Cleomedes, and Persius. Aratus and Lucan also deserve consideration, 
although their relation to Stoicism is more complex.  
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22 The following summary presumes the continuity of what are sometimes 
distinguished as “self-appropriation” and “social appropriation.” In this I agree with 
Brennan 154-68. Key testimonia regarding appropriation include Diogenes Laertius 
7.85-6 = LS 57A, Cicero Fin. 3.62-8 (excerpted by LS 57F), Seneca Ep. Mor. 121 
(excerpted by LS 57B), Hierocles Elements of Ethics esp. VI-IX = p. 16-25 (excerpted 
by LS 57C, D, G), and Aulus Gellius 12.5.7 = SVF 3.181.   
23 Ramelli helpfully connects this definition with Hierocles’ explanation that the 
hegemonic part of every organism perceives all parts of both the organism’s body 
and its soul (55, citing Hierocles Elements of Ethics IV.44-52 = p. 12-13). On this 
Stoic theory of “proprioception” see Long “Hierocles.”   
24 “Relative disposition” is the fourth of the so-called Stoic ontological “categories” or 
“genera,” on which see the testimony gathered at LS 29. Note also that virtue is 
defined as the soul in a certain disposition (Seneca Ep. Mor. 113.2). Compare 
Hierocles El. Eth. IV.27-53 = p. 12-13, which connects the “tensive movement”  of the 
soul, which is a “sustaining power,” with the organism’s continuous and complete 
self-perception, which occurs by the oscillation of this tensive movement outward 
from the hegemonic part to the extremities and back again.   
25 The Greek terms are aresein and euarestein (Hierocles El .Eth. VI.40-5 = p. 18-
19), sphodron himeron (ibid. VII.1-5 = p. 18-19), philautias (ibid. VII.20-5 = p. 20-1), 
and eunoētikōs (ibid. IX.5-9 = p. 24-5). 
26 On bodily integrity, see LS 57A.1-3, Sen. Ep. Mor. 121.18-24, Hierocles El. Eth. 
VI.54-VII.50 = p. 18-21; on children, LS 57F.1; on friends, Hierocles El. Eth. 11.15-20 
= p. 28-9; on spouses, see the discussion of the treatment of marriage by Antipater, 
Musonius, Hierocles, and Seneca by Reydams-Schils 143-76.  
27 This convention is never (to my knowledge) articulated, a silence that in itself 
deserves further analysis. The neo-Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias attributes to 
the Stoics the claim that “there have been just one or two good men, as their fables 
maintain, like some absurd and unnatural creature rarer than the Ethiopian’s 
phoenix” (LS 57N.2).  
28 Similarly, an infinite distance separates vice from virtue: “just as in the sea the man 
an arm’s length from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk five 
hundred fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are no less in a state 
of vice than those who are far from it” (LS 61T).  
29 See also my reading of Musonius’ “masochistic” jubilation in Whether We Should 
Always Obey Our Fathers, which complements the argument I make here (“Obeying 
Your Father,” 192-7).  
30 For Kristeva the object of “the need to believe” is “a truth that keeps me, makes me 
exist” (This Incredible Need 3); such a truth recalls the self-certainty of mother-child 
“oceanic feeling” or the loving support from the “imaginary father” (This Incredible 
Need 1-10).  
31 A claim advanced in innumerable Stoic texts, e.g. LS 57F.3, 63D-E, Epictetus 
Discourses 2.8.10-12. 32!Compare Seneca’s paean to the nourishing “breaths” of the earth at Natural 
Questions 2.16.1-3. !
33 In “A General Theory of Sacrifice,” Vernant writes, “if one circumvents sacrifice . . . 
by consuming only undefiled food or by existing on odors only . . . it becomes 
possible to attain a state of total communion that can be taken just as easily as a 
return to the tender familiarity of all creatures of the Golden Age or as a descent into 
the chaos and confusion of savagery” (298). 
34 “Uncanny strangeness” (étrangeté inquiétante, the French translation of Freud’s 
das Unheimliche) is one of the many avatars of the archaic Thing (Kristeva Strangers 
182-92; 214 n. 19).  
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35 On the defects in Lang’s 1881 Teubner edition, which I use for this paper, see 
Most 214-16. While revising this for publication I became aware that George Boys-
Stones is preparing an English translation.  
36 “By shifting back and forth from the disowned meaning, still present just the same, 
of the remnants of antiquity for instance (thus, Venus or ‘the royal crown’) to the 
literal meaning that the Christian spiritualist context attributes to all things, allegory is 
a tenseness of meanings between their depression/depreciation and their signifying 
exaltation (Venus becomes the allegory of Christian love)” (Black Sun 101-2).  
37 Reading monon ton anthrōpon  where Lang prints monon ton anthrōpōn. 
